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[T]he gated and walled community is a new phenomenon on the
social scene, and, in the spirit of the foregoing pronouncement, the
ingenuity of the law will not be deterred in redressing grievances
which arise, as here, from a needless and exaggerated insistence upon
private property rights... [that] results in a pointless discrimination
which causes serious financial detriment to another.'
Thirteen years later, the optimism of a California Court of Appeal seems
unwarranted. As the number of residential associations has increased, the
consequent litigation has arisen largely in the context of disputes between
residential associations and their members over the content of frequently
intrusive rules and regulations. Legal scholarship has followed this trend.
Reading the endless paeans to liberty of contract, one might fail to recognize
the serious externalities that accompany residential associations, affecting
nonmembers who were party to no contract. Residential associations and gated
communities often restrict nonmembers' freedom of speech, limit nonmembers'
freedom of movement, and engage in racial discrimination against
nonmembers. In identifying some of the social problems created and
exacerbated by residential associations, this Note will suggest an appropriate
legal framework within which these burdens may be analyzed.
Variously known as homeowners' associations, gated communities, and
property owners' associations,2 residential associations are an increasingly
1. Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 826 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed
for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1192 (1982).
2. "Residential community associations," or "RCAs," is the term used in UNITED STATES ADVISORY
COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS: PRIVATE
GOVERNMENTS IN THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL SYSTEM? (1989) [hereinafter ACIR REPORT]. Additionally,
the term "residential association" seems preferable to the equally common "homeowners' association" since
the association does not truly belong to the homeowners: "Mhe developer possesses nearly absolute control
over the community." Uriel Reichman, Residential Private Governments: An Introductory Survey, 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 253, 286 (1976). The developer also lays much of the legal foundation for the association.
See ROBERT JAY DILGER, NEIGHBORHOOD POLITICS: RESIDENTIAL COMMUNITY ASSOCIATIONS IN
AMERICAN GOVERNANCE 12-14 (1992).
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popular option for Americans weary of crime, social ills, and the inability of
government to address these pressing concerns. In form, residential association
agreements are ownership deeds that require membership in the association,3
assess mandatory dues to fund the services provided by the association, and
specify a number of covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) governing
the behavior of members. Residential associations have many different
structures, including condominium projects, but eighty percent involve the
administration of territory such that they resemble communities in the broader
sense rather than simply buildings.
While a great deal has been written about residential associations,6 the
literature has largely concentrated on disputes between residential associations
and their members. Particularly fertile ground for attention have been the many
colorful lawsuits contesting the rules and regulations of residential associations,
banning as a threat to community order such things as basketball hoops over
garages,7 heavy dogs,8 cats of any weight,9 too many poodles,'" or
Although the major text in this area uses the term "Property Owners Association," see ROBERT G.
NATELSON, LAW OF PROPERTY OWNERS ASSOCIATIONS (1989), this fails to convey adequately the
communal nature of certain parts of the property. Other commonly used appellations are "planned unit
developments" (PUDs), a term not employed in its literal sense, but intended simply to refer to certain
residential arrangements, id., and "common interest developments" (CIDs), see EVAN McKENZIE,
PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENTS (1994).
3. One guide to residential associations defines a "Property Owners Association" as "an organization
regulating and/or providing services for a land subdivision, which organization is created by covenants
running with the land and whose membership consists of holders of units in the subdivision." NATELSON,
supra note 2, at 3.
4. ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. Some CC&Rs are quite specific and eminently sensible: Bylaw
VI § 7(k) of the Bailey, a condominium in Washington, D.C., provides that 'No Barry Manilow records,
tapes or CDs may be owned or played on the premises."' Carl B. Kress, Beyond Nahrstedt: Reviewing
Restrictions Governing Life in a Property Owner Association, 42 UCLA L. REV. 837, 840 n.12 (1995).
5. See ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at 12. Note that "territory," defined broadly, may include certain
condominium associations.
6. The definitive text on the topic is NATELSON, supra note 2. See also Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and
Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1519 (1982); Gerald E. Frug, Cities and Homeowners
Associations: A Reply, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1589 (1982); Wayne S. Hyatt & James B. Rhoads, Concepts
of Liability in the Development and Administration of Condominium and Home Owners Associations, 12
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 915 (1976); Reichman, supra note 2; Note, The Rule of Law in Residential
Associations, 99 HARV. L. REV. 472 (1985).
7. A Newport Beach, California, residential association attempted to prevent one homeowner from
keeping her family's basketball hoop over the garage door. After fighting the suit for eight years, at a cost
of over $10,000 to the homeowner, the parties settled, allowing the hoop to remain. See DILGER, supra note
2, at 61.
8. In a celebrated dispute from Boca Raton, one homeowners' association resident was required to
attend a court-supervised weigh-in of his 29 -pound dog. The association's CC&Rs specified a 30-pound
limit for pets; his was suspected of being overweight. See Karen E. Klein, Code Blues: Rules That Govern
Life in Homeowners' Associations Are Being Challenged in Court by Angry Owners, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 5,
1995, at KI.
9. The California Supreme Court recently upheld a condominium association's prohibition on animals
against a resident who sued rather than have her three cats deported. See Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village
Condominium Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994). The battle over the three felines, named "Boo-Boo,"
"Dockers," and "Tulip," was joined when Nahrstedt responded to the association's first removal order with,
.... 'Don't you F- with my cats."' Kress, supra note 4, at 851 n.70 (quoting Barbara Steuart, Cat Fight
Over Condo Rights; How Far Can Condo Restrictions Go?, RECORDER, June 8, 1994, at 1); see also Sheri
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smooching grandparents." Yet there is another set of issues that has not
received extended consideration. As the number of residential associations
increases, conflicts with nonmembers over the use of public space and public
resources will arise more frequently. The jurisprudential framework developed
to referee disputes between associations and their members cannot apply with
equal efficacy to disputes between associations and nonmembers. Courts must
move from the domain of the law of contracts and servitudes to grapple with
the impact of residential communities on outsiders, whether these outsiders
challenge the community by attempting to prevent their establishment, 2
objecting to their authority, 3 or questioning their consumption of public
resources.
4
This Note will argue that the harms imposed on society by residential
associations are significant and that courts should consider curtailing their
power over nonmembers. Part I will discuss the reasons for the rise of the
residential association as a form of semiprivate government. Part II will assess
the often significant harms inflicted by residential associations on nonmembers.
Finally, Part Il will argue that the most appropriate way to limit these
undesired effects on outside communities is through the application of the
"state action" doctrine. The state action framework is particularly useful not
because it would increase the degree of liability assumed by residential
associations, although this would be the likely result, but because it best speaks
to the nature of the problems involved. Residential associations cause harms
to nonmembers by developing exclusive communities, by gating formerly
public streets and neighborhoods, and by increasing the fiscal burdens of cities
and states. Since the ability to wield such power is largely associated with the
state, only by recognizing the quasi-governmental nature of these associations
and their actions can the unique conflicts they engender be adequately
addressed.' 5 Furthermore, treating residential associations as state actors will
require them to assume a level of responsibility consistent with the powers
they enjoy.
L. Marvin, California Supreme Court Survey February 1994-December 1994, 22 PEPP. L. REv. 1675,
1692-97 (1995).
10. See Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 418 A.2d 1233 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1980)
(upholding restriction limiting unit owners to one dog per unit).
11. "In Santa Ana, a 51-year-old grandmother received a warning citation from her condominium
association for kissing a friend good night in her driveway." Richard Louv, Homeowner Group a Dubious
New Ruler, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., July 27, 1994, at A2.
12. See infra Subsection II.A.I.
13. See infra Subsections II.A.2-3.
14. See infra Section II.B.
15. Hence this analysis replies to the challenge issued by one devotee of residential associations:
Unless a clear and convincing case is made that the residential private government infringes the
constitutional rights of nonowners and that such a violation is so injurious as to outweigh the
constitutionally protected rights of free association and property privileges of the homeowners,
the public law route should not be considered.
Reichman, supra note 2, at 301 (footnote omitted).
1995]
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 105: 761
The question of whether to treat residential associations as state actors has
been addressed by numerous state court decisions, producing little
consensus.16 The difficulty of reconciling community with exclusion explains
much of this ambivalence and confusion over how to treat these entities. 17 On
one hand, residential associations may be seen to embody cohesive, nurturing
communities, a throwback to small-town American life, when people still had
a sense of civic responsibility. On the other hand, small-town America has
known its share of racial discrimination and exclusion of undesirables. It is
difficult to say whether modern residential associations truly embody one
paradigm or the other. Yet the growing number of Americans who live in
residential associations, and the growing number affected by these associations,
compel a thorough examination of their nature, the harms they cause, and
possible remedies for these harms. This Note will suggest that treating
residential associations as state actors is the proper approach to regulating these
harms.
I. THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL ASSOCIATIONS
A. History and Numbers
Voluntary associations seem to be constitutive of the American character.
In 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville noted, "Americans of all ages, all conditions,
and all dispositions, constantly form associations .... religious, moral,
serious, futile, general or restricted, enormous or diminutive."' 8 Residential
associations in particular, however, represent a relatively recent phenomenon.
While they may be traced at least as far back as 1831, when Gramercy Park
was formed in New York City,19 in 1962 there were still fewer than 500
homeowners' associations in the United States.20 The growth in the number
16. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (holding that judicially enforced
association age restriction constituted state action but rule was rationally related to legitimate objective);
Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed for want
of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1192 (1982) (holding that exclusion of newspaper from
residential community by governing association contributed to finding of impermissible state action and
violated publisher's rights secured by California Constitution); Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park
Ass'n, 502 So. 2d 1380 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (holding that homeowners' association governing mobile
home park was not state actor).
17. This is the main argument in Clayton P. Gillette, Courts, Covenants, and Communities, 61 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1375 (1994). Gillette briefly considers the impact of residential associations on nonresidents, id.
at 1431-41, but believes that the call for scrutiny by courts would "swallow[] up the argument for judicial
restraint," Id. at 1431.
18. 2 ALExIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 114 (Phillips Bradley ed. & Henry Reeve
trans., 1945) (1835).
19. NATELSON, supra note 2, at 17. Another commentator views Gramercy Square merely as a
"precedent" and maintains that Louisburg Square in Boston was actually the first residential association in
the United States. See DILGER, supra note 2, at 43-44 (describing purpose of Louisburg Square
Association); see also infra note 33.
20. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 10.
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of residential associations since then is best described as "explosive."'" In
1970, there were 10,000; in 1980, 55,000; in 1990, 130,000; and in 1992,
150,000, covering thirty-two million people,22 or roughly twelve percent of
the population.2 Some insist that the number of residential associations even
exceeds the number of cities. 24
Residential associations come in three basic forms: condominium
associations; homeowners' associations, which involve the management of
common property; and cooperative associations. Roughly fifty-five percent of
residential associations are condominium associations; the remaining forty-five
percent are almost all homeowners' associations.5 This Note will concentrate
on homeowners' associations because they generate far greater friction with
nonmembers than do condominiums.26 For the purposes of this Note,
therefore, the phrase "residential association" refers largely to a neighborhood
whose members have decided to wall themselves off or privatize their streets
rather than to a condominium development that has dominion over little
besides a cul-de-sac and a parking lot.
B. Explanations for Expansion
Primary among the motivations to join a residential association is the
perceived increase in security the development provides. Most important for
the residents of Rotonda condominiums in northern Virginia, for example, is
that "they feel safe." 27 The concern for safety has led most associations to
employ private security guards; some have taken the additional precaution of
constructing gates or even moats.28 In fact, partially as a result of the growth
21. NATELSON, supra note 2, at 32.
22. MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 10-11; see also DILGER, supra note 2, at 49 (maintaining that 1960s
marked "basic watershed" in residential association growth). A more recent report distinguishes between
the 28 million who live in an area governed by a private community association and the 4 million who live
in a closed-off or gated community. Timothy Egan, Many Seek Security in Private Communities, N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 3, 1995, at Al, A22.
23. See ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at 4 (basing percentage on figure of 29 million). These
astronomical figures, moreover, are underestimates, as membership in and reporting to the national
Community Associations Institute (CAI), which supplies these statistics, are voluntary. Id.
24. See Ellickson, supra note 6, at 1520. Residential associations are most common in California,
Florida, Texas, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia. ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at 11. The report notes
that "[t]his reflects the distribution of CAI membership, but probably understates the number of RCAs,
particularly in New York" Id. They are least common in the Midwestem states. See id. (reporting that only
10% of CAI-member RCAs are located in Midwest).
25. ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at i1. Cooperative associations constitute less than two percent of
all associations. Id.
26. Note that the public rights to access and freedom of movement are attenuated if we are concerned
with a condominium development; the public at large has a much weaker right, if any, to walk in the
common hallways of a condominium project than to travel on public streets. Thus while much of this Note
will not apply to self-contained condominium units, such units may still impose burdens on the outside
world by, for example, requesting tax deductions for their association dues. See infra Subsection II.B.2.
27. Ann Mariano, Enclosed Communities: Havens, or Worse? As Numbers Grow, Critics See Ominous
Trend of Segregating Residents by Income, Age, Race, VASH. POST, Apr. 9, 1994, at El.
28. Id. at E6.
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in popularity of residential associations, "the total number of private security
guards in the United States now exceeds the number of public police
officers." 29 Some communities take even more extensive precautions: "Walls
are only the beginning. Inside may be surveillance cameras, infrared sensors,
motion detectors .... St. Andrews, a gated community in Boca Raton,
Florida, spends over $1 million a year on helicopters and canine patrols.
30
Compounding this protective attitude toward personal security is the
growing sense that government has failed to do enough to preserve property
values. The national Community Associations Institute (CAI) cites the "greatly
diminished confidence in the capability of the nation's basic institutions to
meet public needs" as an important reason for the popularity of associations.3,
Joining a residential association has the benefit of preserving and enhancing
the value of what is often one's largest investment: one's home and the real
estate on which it is situated. Concern for property values, therefore, explains
much of the popularity of residential associations, and the associations'
CC&Rs reflect this priority. Seemingly onerous and arbitrary restrictions have
been upheld in a variety of courts on the ground that they maintain the
character of the community and thus the value of the real estate within it.
32
Furthermore, the racial and economic homogeneity fostered by many
residential associations is not without appeal for some homebuyers. While it
would certainly be an exaggeration to attribute racist or classist sentiments to
all members of these associations, such organizations provide a potent means
of retreating into homogeneous enclaves undisturbed by the undesirably
different.33 Whether this community structure is largely an attempt to exclude
29. Robert B. Reich, Secession of the Successful, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 20, 1991, § 6, at 16, 42.
30. David Dillon, Fortress America, PLANNING, June 1994, at 8, 8.
31. URBAN LAND INST./COMMUNrrY ASS'NS INST., MANAGING A SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY
ASSOCIATION 2 (1974), quoted in MCKENZIE, supra note 2, at 137. The Institute continues, "the CA
[Community Association] has emerged as a new, close-to-home institution through which citizens can have
a very real role in influencing those affairs that shape their lives and those of their families, as well as their
environment." Id.
32. See, e.g., Amoco Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 478 N.E.2d 860, 862 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985) (affirming
grant of injunction to developer of residential community enforcing restriction on use of residential property
for business purposes), which cites the declaration of trust's commitment to "the distinctive qualities,
amenities and characteristics of the area so that it would at all times be regarded as a residential community
of outstanding excellence." Id. In Lyons v. King, 397 So. 2d 964, 965, 968 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(affirming trial court judgment that association did not act in "arbitrary and unreasonable manner" in
refusing to approve prospective purchasers who intended to rent rather than occupy unit), the court relied
on the association's stated interest in maintaining "a community of congenial residents who are financially
responsible and thus protect the value of the apartments." Id. But see Robert G. Natelson, Consent,
Coercion, and "Reasonableness" in Private Law: The Special Case of the Property Owners Association,
51 OHIO ST. L.J. 41, 44 (1990) (arguing that courts have "severely limited an association's power to engage
in community enhancement").
33. One of the first residential associations in the country served this very purpose: Louisburg Square
on Boston's Beacon Hill employed use and occupancy restrictions to keep out "Negroes, Irish, [and]
Mongolians," among others. John McClaughry, Private Idahoes, REASON, Aug./Sept. 1995, at 54, 54-55
(reviewing DILGER, supra note 2, FRED FOLDVARY, PUBLIC GOODS AND PRIVATE COMMUNITIES (1994),
and MCKENZIE, supra note 2).
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racial minorities or the poor is a difficult question.34 Robert Reich, now
Secretary of Labor, insisted in 1991 that, "racial exclusion is neither the
primary motive for the separation nor a necessary consequence. Lower-income
whites are similarly excluded, and high-income black symbolic analysts are
often welcomed.,, 35 Reich's observation, however, can also be explained by
the fact that discrimination on the basis of class is largely immune from legal
challenge while discrimination on the basis of race is not.36 Whatever the sort
of division sought, however, residential associations may serve as a powerful
tool for segregation.
In sum, residential associations have a powerful appeal for the "Morning
in America" crowd. One gated community advertises by asking prospective
buyers to imagine "a 'perfect place to live ... outside the pandemonium of the
city', where there can be 'a return to simpler times, when you knew you were
secure within the boundaries of your own neighborhood... [and] where
children could play unattended and be safe after dark."', 37 The growth of
residential associations testifies to the widespread feeling that crime has spun
out of control and that the state has allowed the social fabric to unravel and
is impotent to stop this decay. Yet left unchecked, the separatism of residential
associations will likely hasten this disintegration. The next part of this Note
describes how allowing the untrammeled enjoyment of benefits by the seceding
few creates a wide variety of problems affecting both the rights and the
welfare of nonmembers.
II. HARMS IMPOSED BY RESIDENTIAL ASSOCIATIONS
The development of a residential association does not simply bring an
improvement in the lives of its members; it affects members of the wider
community who are compelled to forgo their rights to what was once public
space. Far from losing merely the "freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf,"35
nonmembers must forfeit their right to live in certain areas, their right to move
about freely, their constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due
process, and their right to a fair share of the public fisc. These deprivations,
34. Note, however, that even poor minority communities may have residential associations. In Los
Angeles, several public housing projects have gated themselves off to defeat crime. As one resident of Mar
Gardens explains, "'ve want the same protection as white folks."' Dillon, supra note 30, at 8; see also
David Beard, Puerto Rico Building Walls to Keep Out Crime; Some Say "Closed Communities" Will
Aggravate Effects of Economic Segregation, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 2, 1992, at A4 (noting that both suburbs and
housing projects in Puerto Rico have begun walling themselves off).
35. Reich, supra note 29, at 45.
36. See infra note 39.
37. Dillon, supra note 30, at 9 (alterations in original). Or, put less lyrically, residential associations
facilitate "[t]he protection of property values, the preservation of social status and the defense of the
psychological and emotional benefits derived from a familiar and dependable environment." Richard
Briffault, Our Localism: Part Hl-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 CoLUm. L. REV. 346, 372 (1990).
38. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
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most importantly, are linked directly to the residential association's
unacknowledged but de facto status as a quasi-governmental organization.
Residential associations enjoy a degree of power virtually equal to that of
municipal governments but assume none of the corresponding liabilities.
A. Who Is Excluded?
1. The Case of the South Carolina Sea Islands
The very establishment of a residential association is fraught with potential
for discrimination on the basis of race and class.3 9 Despite decades of
commitment to racial integration, the United States continues to fall short in
providing equal opportunity to black homeowners, perpetuating a culture of
division and domination.40  Whether intentionally or unintentionally,
developers often feed these discriminatory forces and thereby taint subsequent
grants of authority by states or municipalities to residential associations. A case
in point is Hilton Head, South Carolina. Famed for hosting the Renaissance
Weekend retreat for baby boom wunderkinder,41 Hilton Head may be equally
well known for its system of exclusive property developments, named, with
apparent lack of concern for historical irony, "plantations." These gated resort
villages, with names such as Shipyard Plantation, Port Royal Plantation,
Wexford Plantation, Colleton River Plantation, and Hilton Head Plantation, are
occupied largely by the wealthy and white, to the exclusion of the local black
population.42 As one local historian acidly commented, "'It used to be you
couldn't get off the plantations. Now you can't get on."'43
39. Of course, discrimination on the basis of class is not unconstitutional. San Antonio Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that Texas school financing scheme resulting in educational
disparities between poor and wealthy districts did not violate Fourteenth Amendment). Indeed, the state
frequently makes a variety of policy decisions that, although facially neutral, may have undesirable class-
based discriminatory effects.
40. See DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND THE
MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS 221-23 (1993) (demonstrating that with respect to housing, "racial
segregation still constitutes a fundamental cleavage in American society"); see also Richard Thompson
Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal Analysis, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1843, 1847
(1994) (citing MASSEY & DENTON, supra).
41. Renaissance attendees have included President Clinton. See Todd S. Purdum, The President
Welcomes '95 with Old Songs and Friends, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 1995, § 1, at 9.
42. Peter Applebome, Tourism Enriches an Island Resort, But Hilton Head Blacks Feel Left Out, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 2, 1994, at A18. Hilton Head is by no means unique in this respect. For example, "[a]t Society
Hill [a residential association in New Jersey], a group of residents appeared surprised when a stranger
remarked on the absence of Blacks among them. 'I never noticed it until you asked,' said David DeLuca,
treasurer of the homeowners' association." Diana Jean Schemo, Escape from Suburbia: Community
Associations Thrive Amid Debate on Freedom, Privacy and Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1994, at B 1,
B6.
43. Applebome, supra note 42, at AI8 (quoting Daufuskie historian Billie Bum). It is true that Hilton
Head plantation members include black basketball star Michael Jordan, id., but these exceptions are few,
far between, and exceedingly wealthy.
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The burgeoning development of resorts like Hilton Head has mobilized
efforts to build other plantations on islands off the South Carolina coast. As
"the... coast is increasingly becoming a walled resource,"'  Daufuskie
Island, for example, has become more and more a focus of developers'
attention. Daufuskie is inhabited mostly by the Gullah people, descendants of
freed slaves who have largely preserved their language and West African
culture45 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund has alleged that the owner of one
plantation, International Paper Corporation, colluded with the Beaufort County
government to coerce the Gullah people to leave Daufuskie through tax
increases, land seizures, and inadequate public services.46 In addition to
throwing into stark relief the racial implications of market forces in shaping
developers' choices,4 7 the Daufuskie dispute also illustrates the possibility that
local governments will collude with developers to create attractive residential
associations even at the price of encouraging racial discrimination.4" As
subsequent sections of this Note will argue, the reliance upon state power to
effect discrimination has profound constitutional implications.
2. The Problem with Private Streets
A more common demonstration of the power of residential associations is
the "private streets" movement. While some developers resort to the argument
that they simply built upon barren property unencumbered by any public claim,
demands that municipalities declare streets to be private reveal clear cases of
removing property from the public realm and excluding nonmembers. Both
total and partial exclusion raise issues of due process and equal protection:
Disposition of a public resource is made by a small number of people who
decide what restrictions will apply to "their" streets; these restrictions, in turn,
may provide a wide range of discretion to security personnel, resulting in
discriminatory enforcement of the association's regulations. Even if
44. Frank Heflin, Closed Gates Trouble Outsiders, PROGRESSIVE, Oct. 1993, at 32, 32. For an
extensive discussion of Gullah culture and society, see PAT CONROY, THE vATER IS WIDE (1972)
(describing author's experience as teacher in Gullah school).
45. Developers Accused of Anti-Black Move, PLAIN DEALER, Nov. 19, 1992, at 10A.
46. Developer Denies Civil Rights Allegations, WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1992, at All. Officials from
the 25-million-member National Council of Churches declared in 1990 that developers on Hilton Head
"were committing 'cultural genocide."' Heflin, supra note 44, at 33. After a three-year struggle, the LDF
and the developers eventually reached an agreement by which development would continue without forcing
more residents off the island. See Harvey Berkman, The Battle of "Hilton Head I, " NAT. L.J., Dec. 19,
1994, at A4.
47. There are environmental considerations as well. Frequently, residential associations "are named
for the species or landscape that was eliminated to make way for the development." Egan, supra note 22,
at A22 (citing JOEL GARREAu, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 471 (1991) ("You name a place
for what is no longer there as a result of your actions.")).
48. Residential associations may also demand other limitations on the use of their property,
encouraging local governments to employ restrictive zoning and land-use policies. Briffault suggests that
"the emergence of the independent residential suburb may have contributed to the judicial endorsement of
local exclusionary practices." Briffault, supra note 37, at 368.
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discrimination is not the issue, gated communities violate the right to travel49
by preventing nonmembers from using formerly public streets.
In many places, the privatization of formerly public property is well
advanced. Ladue and Olivette, for example, two small suburban towns in St.
Louis County, Missouri, are "virtually blanketed" by private-street
organizations.5 0 The major service these associations provide, in addition to
street lighting and security patrols, is the barricading or chaining off of their
streets, effectively closing entire swathes of the township to other residents.5'
Nearby St. Louis has also experimented extensively with a policy of allowing
associations to close off once-public streets. The city essentially transfers the
deed to association residents on the condition that they accept responsibility for
the neighborhood. 2 Advocates insist that the program has resulted in more
cohesive, stable, and safe neighborhoods. 3
Yet private streets may well inflict harms on the outside community. In a
1994 California case, Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic
Ass'n,54 a group of Los Angeles homeowners proposed to privatize their
streets out of concern for increasing violence, crime, and graffiti. The streets
that were to become private were part of a historic neighborhood, in which
many of the homes had been designed by noted architects.55 In addition to
being deprived of access to these homes, nonmembers would have been unable
to use the formerly public streets and sidewalks for commuting to work or
jogging. 6 Some of these individuals formed Citizens Against Gated Enclaves
49. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 338-39 (1972) (striking down durational residency
requirement for receipt of welfare benefits as violative of constitutionally protected right to travel). The
Court in Dunn emphasized that, "The right to travel is an 'unconditional personal right,' a right whose
exercise may not be conditioned." Id. at 341 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 643 (1969)). Note
that although the lav at issue in Shapiro affected interstate travel, the Court broadened this principle in
Dunn to strike down a law affecting intercounty travel. See id. at 334.
50. Ladue has 143 subdivisions, with a total population of approximately 9000, while Olivette has 90
subdivisions, with a total population of around 8000. Ronald J. Oakerson, Private Street Associations in
St. Louis County: Subdivisions as Service Providers, in ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at 55, 56. The town
of Ladue is the municipality made famous by the Supreme Court's decision in City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 114
S. Ct. 2038 (1994) (striking down city ordinance prohibiting placement of pro-peace sign on private
citizen's property). Note that the restriction at issue in that case was enacted by the town, not one of the
residential associations within the town. While the Court did not address the question of whether an
association would have been able to enact a similar restriction, much of the case law in this area suggests
that such a restriction would be possible. See infra text accompanying notes 98-102. According to a 1990
analysis, the town of Ladue was one of the ten richest incorporated communities in America. Briffault,
supra note 37, at 353 n.43.
51. See Oakerson, supra note 50, at 55.
52. See Robert H. Nelson, The Privatization of Local Government: From Zoning to RCAs, in ACIR
REPORT. supra note 2. at 45, 49.
53. See id.; see also Maggie Jessup, Suburbanites Putting their Backs to the IVall: Gates, Guards,
Become Sought-After Amenity, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Apr. 14, 1994, at Jl.
54. 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451 (Ct. App. 1994).
55. Id. at 452.
56. Id. at 453.
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(CAGE) and won an injunction in both superior court and in a court of appeal
to prevent the privatization of the streets.57
The legal issue of the accessibility of gated communities or private streets
to nonmembers acquires an additional level of complexity when security
guards or private police are present. Where exclusion is partial and made on
a case-by-case basis, security personnel must make their own decisions as to
which pedestrians are desirable and which are not. The result, as one planning
consultant bluntly put it, is that "'[a] black person who shows up in one of
these places is likely to get busted."' 58 Worse, those unfairly harassed or
unjustifiably asked to leave because of their race or class have little or no
recourse as the residential association is purportedly a purely private entity.
Some associations circumvent the problem of discretion by imposing an entry
fee, which excludes the very poor: Sea Pines Plantation in Hilton Head, for
example, allows pedestrian access for a three-dollar fee.59 Such partial
exclusion by race or by class is in many ways worse than the total exclusion
of all pedestrian traffic; while the latter affects more people, the former more
explicitly reveals the social prejudices that lie behind the impulse to exclude.
The ability of residential associations to carry out any type of exclusion,
moreover, demonstrates that more is at issue here than segregation by income.
It might be argued that residential associations simply embody in design what
high-priced suburbs achieve in practice. Yet while expensive housing markets
may prevent certain individuals from living in certain areas, residential
associations have the additional power to prevent such individuals from even
entering these areas. This distinction is roughly equivalent to the difference
between the steering of minority homebuyers away from certain neighborhoods
and outright Jim Crow-type laws. While the legality of class-based
discrimination prevents the elimination of all harms created by residential
associations, the proposal of this Note attempts to correct as many negative
externalities as possible given this limitation.
3. Restrictions on Freedom of Speech
Closing off entire sections of the community to outsiders or, more
problematically, perceived troublemakers, also has the clear effect of stifling
speech in those neighborhoods. Both political and commercial speech are
muzzled when, for example, "[t]here are no pesky doorbellers, be they
politicians or Girl Scouts, allowed inside [a] community., 60 While the
members of the association may have agreed to such limitations by signing the
57. Id. at 457 (citing "fundamental public interest" in use of streets).
58. Dillon, supra note 30, at 10-11 (quoting Daniel Lauber of River Forest, Illinois).
59. Heflin, supra note 44, at 33.
60. Egan, supra note 22, at Al.
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CC&Rs when they moved in, nonmembers certainly did not consent to the
same sacrifices.
The restrictions on speech that can result from residential associations are
well illustrated by the 1982 California case of Laguna Publishing Co. v.
Golden Rain Foundation,61 the only prominent case thus far in which
nonmembers have prevailed against a residential association's restrictions on
freedom of speech. A California Court of Appeal held that the Leisure World
development near Los Angeles could not prevent promotional distribution of
a newspaper to its members simply because it was not Leisure World's own
in-house paper. The court emphasized that the prohibition against distribution
of newspapers turned the association's membership into a captive audience for
the in-house paper. Having allowed distribution of one publication, Leisure
World could not then engage in viewpoint discrimination by disallowing the
distribution of others.62 Leisure World's restriction on speech by nonmembers
dramatically illustrates the ability of developers to create a captive audience,
access to which may then be auctioned off to the highest bidder. Where such
communities are the dominant form of residential living, less well-financed or
less popular viewpoints run the risk of being heard rarely if at all.
In addition to expressing profound concern about the harms caused by the
exclusionary powers of residential associations,63 the Laguna court made clear
its debt to the 1945 Supreme Court decision in Marsh v. Alabama, 64 which
upheld the right of a Jehovah's Witness to distribute religious leaflets in
Chickasaw, Alabama, a company town in which every street was owned by a
private corporation. Although the modern analogs to Marsh could well be
cases concerning residential associations, thus far its logic has been applied far
more frequently in cases involving shopping malls that seek to limit free
speech on their premises. The conflict between mall owners and speakers or
petitioners has had varied results, largely owing to a 1976 Supreme Court
decision holding that there is no federal constitutional right to free speech in
shopping malls,6 which pushed the issue to the states for resolution.66
61. 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 815 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed for vant of a substantial federal question,
459 U.S. 1192 (1982).
62. Id. at 829. This principle, however, does not extend to cable providers. See Cox Cable San Diego,
Inc. v. Bookspan, 240 Cal. Rptr. 407, 409 (Ct. App. 1987) (holding that cable television provider had no
First Amendment right of access to condominium development as cable television medium "differs
significantly" from print medium).
63. See supra text accompanying note 1.
64. Laguna, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 824 (citing Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946)).
65. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
66. Mall owners have prevailed in Arizona, Connecticut, Georgia, Michigan, New York, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Washington, and Wisconsin, largely on the ground that they are not state actors.
See Fiesta Mall Venture v. Mecham Recall Comm., 767 P.2d 719 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988); Cologne v.
Westfarms Assocs., 469 A.2d 1201 (Conn. 1984); Citizens for Ethical Gov't, Inc. v. Gwinnett Place
Assocs., 392 S.E.2d 8 (Ga. 1990); Woodland v. Michigan Citizens Lobby, 378 N.W.2d 337 (Mich. 1985);
SHAD Alliance v. Smith Haven Mall, 488 N.E.2d 1211 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Felmet, 273 S.E.2d 708 (N.C.
1981); Westem Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co., 515 A.2d 1331
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Regardless of the outcomes of the mall cases, however, the Marsh principle
that the right to freedom of speech should outweigh the property rights of
owners should be much stronger in the case of residential associations.
Although the vast expanse between J.C. Penney's and Sears may well lay a
stronger claim to being the contemporary American agora than do public
streets, the latter still maintain an important status in free speech jurisprudence.
As the classic statement of the importance of free speech in public streets
explains:
Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have
immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time
out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thought between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.67
When communities are gated, however, the fora for speech are reduced,
penalizing those who are not wealthy enough to purchase access.
Previous suggestions for protecting free speech rights against private
developers are inadequate. One proposal for dealing with the conflict between
free speech and private ownership of quasi-public fora is that "development
permission be conditioned upon the owner's willingness to provide for
expressive entry.' '63 While preempting the exercise of potentially coercive
power by residential associations is certainly a good idea, this approach
wrongly assumes that municipalities will be willing to insist upon the
protection of free speech rights even at the expense of losing a profitable
development. Many local governments may well be willing to abet potentially
unconstitutional behavior by gating a street or declaring it private. As the
Daufuskie example demonstrates, local governments may even encourage
discrimination by coercing residents to leave or make way for residential
associations. Hence the best way to approach and control the harms resulting
from this change in authority is to match the nature of the power exerted with
a correspondingly higher level of responsibility.
(Pa. 1986); Southcenter Joint Venture v. National Democratic Policy Comm., 780 P.2d 1282 (vash. 1989);
Jacobs v. Major, 407 N.W.2d 832 (Wis. 1987).
Free speech advocates, however, have won in California, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Oregon,
largely on the ground that a mall is a public forum. See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 592 P.2d 341,
347 (Cal. 1979), aff'd, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Batchelder v. Allied Stores Int'l, 445 N.E.2d 590, 595 (Mass.
1983); New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty, 650 A.2d 757,774-75 (N.J.
1994), rev. denied sub. non. Short Hills Assoc. v. New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East,
64 U.S.L.W. 3210 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1995); State v. Dameron, 853 P.2d 1285, 1293 (Or. 1993).
67. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (voiding ordinances restricting public speech and
distribution of leaflets but refraining from extending protection to corporation's free speech rights).
68. Curtis J. Berger, Pruneyard Revisited: Political Activity on Private Lands, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 633,
674 (1991).
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B. Who Pays?
In addition to experiencing the loss of rights and privileges entailed in the
privatization of public space, nonmembers are frequently compelled to finance
their own disentitlement. 69 The insistence of the homeowners' lobby on
receiving public funds that inure to the benefit of purely private streets and tax
deductions for association membership fees reveals a desire to share in the
common fisc even while retreating from the common space.
1. The Use of Public Resources
In general, residential associations all over the country have benefitted
from state expenditures on their behalf. Their streets, fire hydrants, street
lamps, and other facilities were paved, installed, or constructed at public
expense.7" The plantations of Hilton Head could never have been built
without federal flood insurance, drawn from taxpayers' pockets." It is far
from clear whether associations adequately reimburse state or local
governments when they assume control over property. More egregiously,
assuming control over property is not always linked to assuming financial
responsibility for its maintenance. Some associations, however, do accept this
responsibility: Several municipalities, including Houston, Texas, Kansas City,
Missouri, and Montgomery County, Maryland, already offer a property tax
rebate to reward residential associations for providing their own services.72
A recent example of the power of residential associations to claim public
funds comes from New Jersey. In early 1993, then-Governor Jim Florio signed
the Municipal Services Act,7 3 which requires local governments either to
provide private communities with public services, including street sweeping,
garbage collection, snow plowing, and street lights, or to reimburse them out
of their taxes for what such services cost.74 Although the New Jersey Act was
passed by the state legislature in 1990,75 its enactment was delayed by
69. This reveals why "privatization" is an imperfect metaphor for this process. This Note uses the term
sparingly.
70. In Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451,456 (Ct.
App. 1994), for example, the city would have remained responsible for street repairs, maintenance, and
services such as lighting and sewage even though the streets would purportedly have been privatized.
71. The General Accounting Office estimates that between 1978 and 1987, $1.1 billion of tax money
was pumped into the Federal Flood Insurance Fund. See Heflin, supra note 44, at 33. Obviously, not all
of this money went to Hilton Head.
72. DILGER, supra note 2, at 28-29.
73. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:67-23.2 to 40:67-28 (vest 1995).
74. Id. § 40:67-23.3(a) provides, "the goveming body of every municipality shall reimburse a qualified
private community for the following services.., or provide the following services within a qualified
private community in the same fashion as the municipality provides these services on public roads and
streets .... "The statute then goes on to list a host of services, including those enumerated above.
75. The legislation was passed "under pressure from members of community associations who paid
both local taxes and the associations' maintenance fees." Schemo, supra note 42, at B6.
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litigation filed by the New Jersey League of Municipalities, which eventually
reached a compromise with the New Jersey chapter of the Community
Associations Institute in 1992; the end result lowers taxes on unit owners by
$180 annually.76 The Act now specifically exempts from its purview "any
road or street ... not accepted for dedication to public use., 77 An association
that prevents the public from using streets or other properties, therefore, does
not receive any tax reduction. This arrangement is a sensible compromise.
However, association advocates are far from satisfied with this result and hope
to push the costs of maintaining even private streets onto municipalities.
"'Inequities still exist,"' insisted Phyllis Matthey, president of the Coalition of
Associations for Political Action, "'With this legislation there is hope that
these issues can be addressed over time.' 78 The stance of the New Jersey
associations is clear: Their streets are public for the purpose of getting those
services they want yet private for the purpose of excluding those people they
do not want. If New Jersey is a typical example,79 governments are willing
to subsidize the secession of residential streets on the condition that
associations grant full access to those streets. However, residential associations
are sufficiently powerful that even this condition may be relaxed over time.
In sum, residential associations impose a variety of external costs on
neighboring communities. Besides assuming control over facilities created at
public expense, associations may also siphon off additional public resources
through tax deductions. These costs may be as subtle as a campaign to use
public dollars for private streets, as in New Jersey, or as banal as the burdens
imposed by one condominium association in New York, whose air-conditioner
cooling systems pumped gallons of used water into the streets of the
surrounding town."0 The weight of these burdens belies the rhetoric of
separation.
2. The Looming Battle over Tax Deductions
Residential associations generally seek tax status under § 528 of the
Internal Revenue Code. Entitled "Certain Homeowners Associations," this
provision is "the preferred vehicle for most POA's [Property Owners'
76. Andr~e Brooks, Condos and Co-ops Ask Equity, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 6, 1992, §10, at 5.
77. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:67-23.3(b) (West 1995).
78. Rachelle Garbarine, Municipal Services for Condos and Co-ops, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 1993, § 10,
at 9.
79. The position of the New Jersey associations is similar to the position of some residential
associations who have been pushing city governments to assume the costs of municipal services even on
private streets. See Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451,
456 (Ct. App. 1994); Jordan Betz, City Will Consider Taking Over Maintenance of Private Streets, ST.
Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 24, 1994, at 2.
80. See Incorporated Village of Atlantic Beach v. Pebble Cove Homeowners' Ass'n, 527 N.YS.2d
429, 429 (App. Div. 1988). The New York appellate court, however, held that the village was not entitled
to relief. Id. at 430.
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Associations] seeking tax exemption." 81 Section 528(b) imposes a tax of 30%
on the association's income, but § 528(d)(3) allows the exclusion of "exempt
function income," meaning "any amount received as membership dues, fees,
or assessments" from property owners in the association.82 Despite the fact
that an association is not taxed on the membership fees it collects, or perhaps
because the tax arrangement benefits the association rather than the individual
members, one rallying point for homeowners' association advocates has been
the proposal that residents be able to deduct these fees much as they deduct
state and local taxes. This means that all fees paid by members to increase the
value of their property through association-provided improvements would never
be taxed at all.
Were association membership fees tax-deductible, the savings to individual
members could be considerable. The average mandatory membership fee varies
widely. According to a 1989 report, the average annual fee for residential
association members was $867, but the median annual fee was only $336.83
In 1992, members of Leisure World, California, paid a fiat fee of $290 a
month, or $3480 annually.84 In 1989, homeowners in Ladue, Missouri, paid
an annual fee of $123 per household and in nearby Olivette, $67 annually per
household. These fees are an extra burden on homeowners in addition to
property taxes, but it should be recognized that members receive a higher level
of goods and services in return. Still, the perception that residential association
members pay twice for some services does have some obvious political
potential. Executive Council of Home Owners (ECHO) lobbyist Robyn Boyer
Stewart writes, "'It is only a matter of time before the tax-and-equity bomb
blows.... The politician who manages to capture this constituency, speak to
its needs and offer it a voice, will be amply rewarded."' 86
As every tax deduction is to some degree a subsidy, claimants for a
deduction should have to prove both that they are bearing a cost and that there
81. NATELSON, supra note 2, at 546. IRS revenue rulings have made it virtually impossible to qualify
for the exemption under any other section. See D.K. Campbell-Bell, Homeowners Associations-Is Tax
Exemption Worth the Effort?, 20 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 647, 659 (1985).
82. I.R.C. § 528(d)(3) (1988). This is subject to some limitations, however: I.R.C. § 528(c)(1)(B)
(1988) requires that a homeowners' association receive at least 60% of its gross income from membership
dues to qualify under this section, and I.R.C. § 528(c)(1)(C) mandates that "90 percent or more of the
expenditures of the organization for the taxable year be expenditures for the acquisition, construction,
management, maintenance, and care of association property." These expenditures, of course, increase the
value of the property and lay the foundation for future windfalls.
83. ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at 11.
84. This money went to services such as the private security force, a television station, and 12 bus
routes. Government by the Nice, for the Nice, THE ECONOMIST (London), July 25, 1992, at 25 [hereinafter
Government by the Nice].
85. Oakerson, supra note 50, at 57.
86. Louv, supra note 11, at A2. The first politician to seize upon this issue was none other than the
hapless Jimmy Carter, who won the 1975 Florida Democratic primary in part by sending a letter to
condominium associations stating that he would abolish certain "unpopular recreation fees" imposed by
developers. What Carter as President would be able to do about this issue was never clear. See RICHARD
Louv, AMERICA II, at 110 (1983).
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is greater social utility if government bears the cost in their stead. It is worth
asking whether residential associations should enjoy an additional exemption
from public responsibility when their expenditures carry no benefits to anyone
else. Even if an association assumes the cost of its own upkeep, the
municipality's or county's ability to divert funds elsewhere may be more than
offset by the loss in tax revenue from often wealthy secessionist enclaves. In
addition to the lack of public utility in granting such deductions, offering an
exemption makes it even more attractive for homeowner groups to secede. As
explained below, there are a variety of reasons why this is undesirable from
society's vantage point.
C. Social Harms
The most harmful effect of the growth of residential associations may be
the widening of the American class divide. Current Labor Secretary Robert
Reich calls this effect the "secession of the successful. '87 The growing
disengagement of the wealthier and more skilled does not bode well for the
ability of the United States to meet future challenges. It also inflicts a number
of immediate harms. Increasing social separation and division mean that "life
inside and outside of ... [such] communities can represent two different
worlds in terms of service levels, citizenship, governance, financial
responsibilities, and property rights."'88 Although discrimination on the basis
of class is not unconstitutional per se, 89 it is worth examining the deleterious
impact of wealth differentials and the constitutional questions these disparities
may raise.
One especially harmful result of class secession is the diminishing sense
of civic responsibility. Particularly insular residential associations foster the
perception that "one's duties consist of satisfying one's obligations to private
property."9 This lack of concern for social needs is inevitably reflected in
voting behavior. As one commentary puts it, "[I]f affluent Americans choose
to live in private communities which raise their own taxes but do not
redistribute them outside their walls, they are likely to vote to cut spending on
public services that they do not use, ignoring the needs of people who cannot
afford to go private."9' Mere selfishness obviously does not give rise to a
87. Reich, supra note 29, at 16.
88. ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at 13-14.
89. See supra note 39. Exclusionary zoning may, however, be subjected to constitutional challenges.
See Lawrence G. Sager, 7Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent, 21
STAN. L. REV. 767 (1969). But see Reichman, supra note 2, at 301-04 (arguing that restrictions on use of
exclusionary zoning should not apply to servitudes governing residential associations).
90. MCKENZIE, supra note 2. at 196.
91. Government by the Nice, supra note 84, at 26. In other words, "[i]f we're already paying for our
own private services, why should we pay for someone else's police or recreation centers or libraries?"
Louv, supra note 11, at A2. Or, as a more gentle source puts it, association residents "may be inclined to
vote differently on tax and service issues." ACIR REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
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constitutional cause of action. Yet the consequent wealth disparities may create
contentious social and legal issues such as the school-financing scheme that
was at issue in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez.92 Not
all courts, moreover, are wary of engaging these issues. In New Jersey, for
example, a "holy trinity" 93 of cases established that all municipalities and
localities in a given area must share responsibility for the "general welfare" of
their region in meeting its need for low-income housing.94 Furthermore, the
secession of the successful promises to have a critical impact on social policies
that may eventually wind up in court.
Even if some exclusive associations never see the inside of a courtroom,
however, their separatism may still have pernicious social effects. As urban
sociologist Jane Jacobs characterizes the problem, "'It's a gang way of looking
at life, an institutionalization of turf. And if it goes on indefinitely, and gets
intensified, it practically means the end of civilization.' 95
III. RESIDENTIAL ASSOCIATIONS AS STATE ACTORS
The preceding sections have argued that residential associations impose a
number of negative externalities on the communities that surround them. These
negative impacts, moreover, stem from the nature of associations as virtual
governments: They exercise dominion over streets and thoroughfares; pass
rules to regulate access and speech; and employ security personnel to keep the
peace. This part will argue first that the law currently does not adequately deal
with these negative impacts. It will then demonstrate that the functions served
by associations and their interdependent relationships with local governments
transform their basic nature from private to public, such that they should be
regarded as state actors. It is a truism that the Fourteenth Amendment "erects
no shield against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful. 96 Before an aggrieved plaintiff may invoke rights guaranteed by
the Constitution, "it is essential to establish that the State ... is responsible for
the infringement." 97 Yet the distinction between public and private does not
92. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
93. Ford, supra note 40, at 1897.
94. These cases are Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(N.J.) (requiring that municipality's land-use regulation take account of needs of low- and moderate-income
individuals), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975); Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of
Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983) (striking down ordinance on ground that it did not provide for
needs of low-income individuals); and Hills Dev. Co. v. Township of Bernards, 510 A.2d 621 (NJ. 1986)
(pronouncing New Jersey Fair Housing Act constitutional and announcing court's withdrawal from issue).
95. Dillon, supra note 30, at 10. Rice University sociologist Stephen Klineberg concurs: "'If I'm
making it, it's not my responsibility to look after others. That's the direction American society seems to
be going, and it's ominous. It will destroy us in the end."' Id.
96. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948) (holding that state enforcement of private housing
covenants requiring racial discrimination was unconstitutional state action).
97. Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV.
1169, 1171 (1995) (arguing that extent of privatization requires expansion of state action doctrine).
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preclude judicial consideration of the discriminatory conduct of putatively
private entities that rely on state power and privileges. When ostensibly private
conduct takes on a public character, that conduct may be reached through the
application of the state action doctrine.
A. Current Judicial Responses
1. Reasonableness for Members
One way courts might limit the power of residential associations would be
to ask whether the restriction in question is "reasonable"; if not, the restriction
would be invalidated. This is the standard most courts have used when
disgruntled residents have challenged their own association's rules. Because the
restrictions residents object to are usually in the membership contracts they
signed, most courts have asked only whether the rule in question comports
with a standard of "reasonableness," 98 thereby upholding restrictions on
age,99 the presence of pets,'00 and the disposition of property.'"' The
"reasonableness" standard is frequently established by legislatures 0 2 and
derives largely from the law of servitudes.'0 3 At the root of the presumption
of legitimacy accorded an association's CC&Rs is consent. Residents who
complain about any provision of the association's CC&Rs or bylaws must
counter the argument that they read these restrictions, considered them, and
signed anyway. In contrast to one's membership in the broader society, it is
98. Gregory S. Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and Community,
75 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 12-17 (1989). A minority of jurisdictions, including New York, employ a "business
judgment" standard. For a comparison of the two standards, see Kress, supra note 4, at 863-69.
99. See, e.g., Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974) (upholding age restriction even
while finding residential association policy constituted state action); O'Connor v. Village Green Owners
Ass'n, 183 Cal. Rptr. 111 (Ct. App. 1982) (upholding rule limiting occupancy to persons over age
eighteen). But see, e.g., Park Redlands Covenant Control Comm. v. Simon, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Ct. App.
1986) (holding that age restrictions of CC&Rs violated Unruh Civil Rights Act).
100. See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Village Condominium Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275 (Cal. 1994)
(upholding rule banning pets such as cats and dogs from condominium association as "reasonable" under
California Civil Code § 1354); Dulaney Towers Maintenance Corp. v. O'Brey, 418 A.2d 1233 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1980) (sustaining rule prohibiting ownership of too many pets). But see, e.g., Chateau Village
N. Condominium Ass'n v. Jordan, 643 P.2d 791 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982) (refusing to allow association to
apply policy prohibiting additional pets without association's reasonable consideration of request for
exemption).
101. See, e.g., Amoco Realty Co. v. Montalbano, 478 N.E.2d 860 (II1. App. Ct. 1985) (upholding
restriction against use of property for business purposes).
102. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1354 (West Supp. 1995), for example, provides: "The covenants and
restrictions in the declaration shall be enforceable equitable servitudes, unless unreasonable, and shall inure
to the benefit of and bind all owners of separate interests in the development." FLA. STAT. ch. 718.112(3)
(1977) allows a number of restrictions that the Florida Supreme Court interpreted as "reasonable
restrictions" in White Egret Condominium, Inc. v. Franklin, 379 So. 2d 346, 350 (Fla. 1979).
103. See NATELsON, supra note 2, at 48-55. Natelson notes, however, that the relationship is imperfect
since under the law of servitudes, covenants must "run with the land," whereas residential associations
frequently provide a broader range of services and insist on a variety of rules that do not touch or concern
the land per se. Id. at 50.
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asserted, one's membership in an association may be regarded as "wholly
voluntary."'' Despite the low standard of review, even the "reasonableness"
test has been objected to as impermissible interference with contractual
freedom, on the grounds that the only appropriate review of the rule in
question is that performed by the homeowner as he or she signs the
contract. 105
Resolving the disagreements between associations and their members is not
the object of this Note. 10 6 Yet the hotly contested disputes0 7  over the
allocation of responsibilities between associations and their members suggests
the limited usefulness of the "reasonableness" test as a possible tool in
allocating responsibility between associations and the larger polity. Even if it
were clear that all residents had explicitly consented to the CC&Rs or other
bylaws governing their associations, nonmembers simply have no privity of
contract with the associations. Although it is currently the major focus of
residential association jurisprudence, the "reasonableness" standard rests on
premises foreign to the nature of the relationship between associations and
nonmembers. While a sensible inquiry can be made as to whether a contractual
agreement is "reasonable," how can a court decide whether it is "reasonable"
to discriminate or exclude without reference to constitutional standards? Far
from triggering even "reasonableness" as a pretext for judicial activism,
however, these harms have been largely ignored.
104. Ellickson, supra note 6, at 1523. But see NATELSON, supra note 2, at 490 n.9 (arguing that
Ellickson "substantially understates the practical distinctions" between cities and homeowners' associations).
105. Ellickson derides the "reasonableness" test as "an apparent invitiation [sic] to Lochnerian
activism." Ellickson, supra note 6, at 1526. This invitation, however, has not been accepted by the courts.
See supra notes 98-102.
106. It should be noted, however, that the contractual approach makes several questionable
assumptions and is limited in its applicability. First, some critics maintain that it is unrealistic to assert that
membership in the association is "perfectly voluntary" as all sorts of social forces influence one's choices,
from the availability of property and its cost to one's preferences about neighbors. See Ford, supra note
40, at 1883-85. Hence associations simply cannot be viewed "as a miniature version of the liberal society
envisioned by John Locke." Frug, supra note 6, at 1589. Proponents of consent-based theories often fall
victim to what has been called "the tautology of community self-definition" because "although the
governance of such an association may be democratic in form, it may well not be democratic... in
substance if the initial selection of members was highly exclusive." Ford, supra note 40, at 1860. For a
more extensive discussion of the coercive nature of residential associations, see Gregory S. Alexander,
Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REv. 883 (1988).
Second, some measure of coercion is inescapable given the sheer impossibility that the prospective
homeowner is able to veto a provision of the CC&Rs he or she might not like. Hence the idea that owners
agree to all preexisting servitudes has been called "a controversial one." Natelson, supra note 32, at 54.
In fact, "many home buyers do not read or fully understand the neighborhood's CC&Rs prior to purchasing
their homes." DILGER, supra note 2, at 35. These objections, however, have not received a warm reception
in state courts. The prevalence of the "reasonableness" standard seems to foreclose searching inquiry into
the legitimacy of the residential associations' CC&Rs.
107. See, e.g., Associate Justice Kaufman's nasty concurrence in Park Redlands Covenant Control
Commission v. Simon, 226 Cal. Rptr. 199, 207 (Ct. App. 1986):
Finally, while I am bound by the decisions of the California Supreme Court prohibiting age
discrimination in housing, I find those decisions legally and practically inane .... The rights
[of freedom of association] overlooked are at least as significant and as sacrosanct as the rights
of those for whom our high court in its paternalistic wisdom is so solicitous.
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In short, "reasonableness" poses an unacceptably vague question about the
negative externalities of associations on nonmembers and falls far below
guaranteeing the adherence to constitutional standards we should demand of
public bodies.
2. Blocking the Transfer of Authority
A second way that courts might limit the power of residential associations
would be to disallow any transfer of authority from adjacent local governments
to associations, or at least to impose limitations on such transfers. As the latter
route seems to require a high degree of judicial activism, only the former has
been pursued, and even then only rarely. Although preventing the diminution
of public space is a laudable goal, refusing to allow a state or local
government to invest any power in a residential association fails to account for
the ways in which the association could benefit the larger community. This
argument will be addressed more thoroughly below.'0 8 For now, it is worth
noting the inherent problems in blocking all delegations of authority from
governments to associations.
The recent Whitley Heights case provides a clear example of a court
choosing to prevent the transfer of authority to an association."0 9 In granting
an injunction requested by Citizens Against Gated Enclaves, a California Court
of Appeal emphasized that the public trust invested in the streets precluded
their privatization: "'The streets of a city belong to the people of the state, and
the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen."'' 0 Consequently,
"'[a] street may not be vacated for exclusive private use.'..' This Note
shares the basic concerns of the Whitley Heights court. However, this Note
departs from the court's approach for two reasons. The decision in Whitley
Heights is problematic insofar as it precludes the mere existence of
associations. As explained more fully in the following sections, the preferable
solution to the problematic relationship between associations and the public at
large is cohabitation, not complete denial of association members' rights to
freedom of association. A more technical problem with the decision in Whitley
Heights is that the court rested its argument not on a provision of the
California Constitution but on its Vehicle Code," 2 far too narrow a tool to
limit the harms to public rights. What the decision leaves open, therefore, is
108. See infra Subsection I.B.3.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57.
110. Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 454 (Ct.
App. 1994) (quoting City of Lafayette v. County of Contra Costa, 154 Cal. Rptr. 374, 376 (1979)
(overruling Lafayette City Council's decision to close off particularly congested street)).
Ill. Id. at 455 (quoting Constantine v. City of Sunnyvale, 91 Cal. App. 2d 278, 282 (1949)).
112. Specifically, a section of the code states that, "'local authorities may not place gates or other
selective devices on any street which deny or restrict the access of certain members of the public to the
street..' Id. at 453 (quoting CAL. VEH. CODE § 21101.6 (West Supp. 1995)).
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the question of whether the transfer of authority from government to
association endows the latter with the status of a state actor. The next section
will argue that it does.
B. State Action
The state action doctrine provides a means of applying constitutional
guarantees and restrictions to private conduct when that conduct is so
entangled with public authority that it cannot be considered purely private.
This doctrine is necessary to prevent an individual or association, clothed in
the mantle of private conduct, from injuring others through the exercise of
state power. Once regarded as a "conceptual disaster area,''"3 the doctrine
has more recently been considerably yet imperfectly narrowed.11 4 Although
far from crystal clear, the state action doctrine best captures the nature of the
power entrusted to residential associations." 5 It offers an alternative means
of examining the behavior of associations apart from the presumption of
contractual legitimacy, an alternative that is vital to begin to address the
burdens residential associations impose on nonmembers. Hence this section
will argue that courts should subject plaintiffs challenging residential
association authority to a status analysis: With respect to claims made by
nonmembers, residential associations should be treated as state actors,
assuming the facts warrant such a finding." 6 With respect to claims made
113. Charles L. Black, Jr., The Supreme Court, 1966 Term-Foreword: "State Action," Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 HARv. L. REv. 69, 95 (1967).
114. It is now showing renewed signs of expansion, however, following the decline of the approach
taken by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who would almost uniformly deny the presence of state action. See Henry
C. Strickland, The State Action Doctrine and the Rehnquist Court, 18 HASnNGS CONST. L.Q. 587, 643-66
(1991).
115. As well as the abuse of this power: One journalist notes that for residential associations, "in place
of municipal rules are a set of regulations so restrictive that many could be found unconstitutional should
a city government enact them." Egan, supra note 22, at Al. There was some discussion of treating
residential associations as state actors with respect to internal voting procedures at the dawn of associations'
popularity. See, e.g., Comment, Democracy in the New Towns: The Limits of Private Government, 36 U.
CHI. L. REV. 379 (1969) (arguing that residential associations are sufficiently like municipalities that they
should comply with principle of one person, one vote); Note, New Community Development, 11 WASHBURN
L.J. 227 (1972) (same). A few more recent commentators echo this suggestion. See, e.g., DILGER, supra
note 2, at 142-44, 160.
116. This argument is very different in several critical respects from that presented in Brian L.
Weakland, Condominium Associations: Living Under the Due Process Shadow, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 297,
327-30 (1986). While Weakland also proposes a two-part test that would find state action or employ a
reasonableness standard, his does not distinguish between members and nonmembers. In doing so,
Weakland ignores the important difference in status between nonmembers and members; his thesis is
therefore seriously vulnerable to a consent-based argument that members are differently situated than
nonmembers by having agreed to the restrictions they now challenge.
More fundamentally, Weakland proposes that associations should not be subject to a state action test
"so long as [the association] acts within the powers codified by state statute." Id. at 330-31. But this is
backwards. It is precisely when a municipality or state has delegated a share of its power to an association
or individual that the latter is most clearly a state actor. See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500
U.S. 614, 616 (1991) (holding that private party's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black juror
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by members, so long as prior consent was given to the restrictions or rules in
question, the "reasonableness" test will apply." 7
Advocating the application of the state action framework to residential
associations does not imply that every residential association is a state actor:
The test for state action is fundamentally a fact-bound determination, requiring
examination of a wide variety of linkages between the actor and state
authority."s The likelihood that an association will be deemed a state actor
is closely linked to the impact that it has upon the surrounding community.
Associations that gate vast expanses of public streets and consume significant
governmental resources will create stronger presumptions of state action than
groups of homeowners who simply band together and agree to paint their
houses chartreuse.
The state action doctrine has assumed a variety of forms over the past half
century. In 1982, the Supreme Court attempted to unify the various strands of
the doctrine by developing a two-prong test in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil
Co." 9 This test required that:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
State or by a person for whom the State is responsible .... Second,
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor.
1 2
Unfortunately, the Court did not apply this test prong-by-prong to the facts at
issue, instead grounding its finding of state action in the "joint participation"
between the private party and the government.' 2' Nor has the Court followed
would constitute impermissible state action); Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 935 (1932)
(holding that ex parte pretrial attachment order constituted state action violating due process).
117. One immediate and pertinent objection to this approach is that the distinction between members
and nonmembers is not so clear as to presume that a status distinction can be made. After all, perhaps the
most potent means of discrimination is the ability to create barriers to entry that prevent nonmembers from
ever becoming members. Additionally, it is a valid question whether renters of property in the district
should properly be considered members or nonmembers. These individuals "are often purposively
disenfranchised... because they have an incentive to oppose efforts to increase the neighborhood's
property values." DILGER, supra note 2, at 34. The two-tier level of review advanced by this Note, one
which treats nonmembers differently than members, is a compromise between reality and theory. Most case
law follows a predictable pattern. People move in and sign the CC&Rs; they violate the rules; the
association sues for compliance; the court enforces compliance. Generally, residential associations should
be understood to be state actors. The contract between association and resident, however, trumps this
principle in practice and thus necessitates a two-tier level of review.
118. One frequently cited guide to the application of the doctrine remarks, "Only by sifting facts and
weighing circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private conduct be attributed its
true significance." Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 722 (1961) (holding coffee shop's
exclusion of blacks to be impermissible state action as shop was located in municipal building).
119. 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (holding that ex parte pretrial attachment order constituted state action
violating due process).
120. id. at 937.
121. Id. at 942.
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this test in a consistent fashion since, 2 although some circuit courts have
done so.'23 Instead, the Court has applied a variety of gestalt tests capturing
the essence of Lugar's two prongs. Various forms of the state action test seek
to determine whether there is overt action by the state, state enforcement of
state law, denial of relief by the state, the performance of a public or
governmental function by a private entity, or joint participation by or a
symbiotic relationship between the private actor and the state.'24 Fully
understanding the extent of the applicability of the state action doctrine to
residential associations requires analyzing the two formulations of the state
action test most relevant in this context: whether a "symbiotic relationship"
exists between a nominally private entity and the state; or whether the
nominally private entity serves a "public function."'"
State courts have reached wildly different conclusions when faced with the
argument that a residential association qualifies as a state actor. Finding that
"[a] homeowners' association lacks the municipal character of a company
town,' 126 a Florida District Court of Appeal held in 1987 that a homeowners'
association in a mobile home park was not a state actor. In the 1982 California
case requiring a residential association to grant equal access to an outside
newspaper, by contrast, a California Court of Appeal remarked that the
association "in many respects does display many of the attributes of a
municipality."' 27 Finally, an Arizona Court of Appeals held that while a
residential association was a state actor, its age-restrictive covenants did not
amount to impermissible discrimination. 28 While the following discussion
will clarify the doctrinal issues, it should be kept in mind that the state action
test is so acutely sensitive to factual determinations that these seemingly
122. Although Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 618-28 (1991) (holding that private
party's use of peremptory challenges to exclude black juror would constitute inadmissible state action)
applied the Lugar test prong by prong, the Court in Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478 (1988) (holding that due process prevented nonclaim statute from starting to run before reasonably
ascertainable creditors had been notified) collapsed the test to hold simply that "pervasive and substantial"
state involvement constituted state action. Id. at 487.
123. See, e.g., the Tenth Circuit's step-by-step application of the Lugar test in Gilmore v. Salt Lake
Community Action Program, 710 F2d 632, 637-39 (10th Cir. 1983) (maintaining that while community
action agency was state actor, dismissal of its former director was not state action).
124. See Strickland, supra note 114, at 596-634.
125. Katharine Rosenberry divides her analysis this way as well, as these are the only two applicable
forms of the state action test. See Katharine Rosenberry, The Application of the Federal and State
Constitutions to Condominiums, Cooperatives and Planned Developments, 19 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 1, 11-25 (1984) [hereinafter Rosenberry, Application of the Federal and State Constitutions]. The phrase
"symbiotic relationship" first appeared in Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175 (1972) (holding
that state's grant of liquor license to club with racially discriminatory admissions policy did not constitute
state action). The phrase "public function" comes from Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946)
(holding that company-owned town's prohibition on distribution of literature by Jehovah's Witness
constituted impermissible state action).
126. Brock v. Watergate Mobile Home Park Ass'n, 502 So. 2d 1380, 1382 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
127. Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 827 (Ct. App.), appeal
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1192 (1982).
128. See Riley v. Stoves, 526 P.2d 747, 751-54 (Ariz. CL App. 1974).
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contradictory decisions could be reconciled on the grounds that they involved
different relationships between the private entity and the state or differences
in the egregiousness of the discriminatory conduct at issue.
1. The "Symbiotic Relationship" Test
The "symbiotic relationship" criterion originated in the 1961 case of
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority,29 in which the Court found that a
coffee shop operator who refused to serve black customers was a state actor
by virtue of renting space from the State of Delaware in a public building
alongside municipal offices and adjoining a municipal parking lot. Yet the
criteria for determining whether the nature of the relationship with the state
transforms the private entity into a state actor have become far more stringent
since Burton; it is likely that the facts of Burton would not pass muster under
the rule developed in its progeny. 30 In Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,131 for
example, a seven-member majority of the Court refused to find state action
even though the putative state actor was a school for wayward high school
students, nearly all of whom were referred from public schools. Furthermore,
the school complied with a variety of state regulations and received more than
ninety percent of its budget from the state.'32
Under the "symbiotic relationship" test, a court must examine "the extent
to which the actor relies on governmental assistance and benefits" and
"whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by the incidents of
governmental authority."'13 3 The Supreme Court has made clear that the
interrelationship between the private actor and the state must be significant to
meet this standard: A private party does not become a state actor by the mere
fact that "the private entity receives any sort of benefit or service at all from
the State, or if it is subject to state regulation in any degree whatever."'
34
In general, residential associations should qualify as state actors under this
formulation of the state action test. With respect to the first prong of the test,
the state participates in the act of creating a residential association by ceding
some of its authority to the association, which in many cases is the sine qua
non of the association's existence. If one crucial element of the association's
authority is private control over once-public streets, this control can be granted
only at the initial expense of, and with the cooperation of, the state.
129. 365 U.S. 715, 723-25 (1961). Note that the phrase does not actually appear in Burton, but in a
subsequent decision characterizing the case. See supra note 125.
130. See, e.g., Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1010 (1982) (rejecting Burton-based argument as
"vague generalization").
131. 457 U.S. 830 (1982).
132. Id. at 832-33.
133. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 622 (1991) (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948)).
134. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 173 (1972).
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This level of state authority, moreover, implicates governmental power
when the delegated authority is used to exclude or discriminate. In some cases,
the state essentially collaborates with private developers to produce precisely
such a discriminatory result, hoping to use the private entity as a shield. A
clear case involving collusion between a homeowners' association and a
governmental authority is Park Redlands Covenant Control Commission v.
Simon.135 In that case, the municipal authorities struck a deal with a
developer by which the latter would impose minimum-age and maximum-
number restrictions on occupancy. As such regulations would violate
California's Civil Rights Act, the city clearly hoped to "take refuge in the
private party status of the developer."'136 The city even retained the power to
approve any further changes to the restrictions on age and occupancy. 137 A
California Court of Appeal angrily objected that it "[would] not, ostrich-like,
ignore the heavy-handed role played by the City of Redlands in (1) creating,
and (2) continuing the existence of this 'purely private' restriction.' ' 38 The
result in Redlands refutes the argument that in order for state action to be
present, the property must be virtually identical in nature to the company town
in Marsh,'39 and it illustrates how a finding of state action may rely more on
the egregiousness of discriminatory intent than on the extent of the relationship
between the private entity and the state. Furthermore, Redlands suggests that
state action may exist in only one aspect of an association's activities, if that
aspect raises constitutionally relevant questions.
With respect to the second prong of the "symbiotic relationship" test, the
harms described in the first part of this Note could not occur but for the
authority of the state. As "essentially private conduct dependent on state
implementation,"' 40 the behavior that causes these harms constitutes state
action. Every major component of an association's power, particularly its
authority over once-public streets, relies upon an affirmative decision made by
the state to delegate this power to a quasi-governmental organization. State
involvement is implicated in the frequent enforcement by the state of the
association's governing documents, including assessments, transfer of common
areas, meeting times and places, voting rights, elections of the governing body,
135. 226 Cal. Rptr. 199 (Ct. App. 1986).
136. Id. at 206.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. An argument made in Rosenberry, Application of the Federal and State Constitutions, supra note
125, at 25.
140. Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 828 (Ct. App.) (citing Evans
v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966) (holding that reservation of private park for whites only as per donor's
wishes was impermissible state action); Robinson v. Florida, 378 U.S. 153 (1964) (holding that state health
board regulation discouraging restaurant service of blacks and whites together was impermissible state
action); Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (striking down Louisiana statute requiring indication of
candidate's race on ballot as impermissible state action); and Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding
that all-white primary that selected candidates for uncontested general election was state action)), appeal
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1192 (1982).
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and budgeting.'4 ' This is not to say that the mere existence of the state as an
enforcement mechanism is sufficient to meet this part of the state action test.
It is important not to press this point so far as to eliminate the distinction
between public and private, since "state action, in the form of state law, is
present in all legal relationships among private persons."' 42 A Maryland
appellate court, however, found state action in the enforcement of
condominium lien laws because the state participated in the enforcement of
these rules. 43 The U.S. Supreme Court employed a similar rationale in 1988
in Tulsa Professional Collection Services v. Pope,'44 in which it held that the
state's participation in activating and enforcing a nonclaim statute gave rise to
a violation of due process by a collection agency. Hence interdependence
arises when the private entity takes an unconstitutional action and relies upon
the state to effectuate that action. As a California Court of Appeal noted in
Laguna, state action is present "where there is actual or even threatened
enforcement by state law in aid of discriminatory conduct."' 45 Insofar as the
state makes a positive choice to grant an association authority with the
knowledge that this authority will be used for discriminatory purposes, that
association may be regarded as a state actor under this understanding of the
"symbiotic relationship" test.
2. The "Public Function" Test
Failure to meet the requirements of the "symbiotic relationship" test does
not mark the end of the judicial inquiry. A nominally private entity may also
be considered a state actor if it is found to serve a "public function." As with
the "symbiotic relationship" approach, this phrase must be interpreted strictly;
a private entity does not qualify under the "public function" test merely by
serving the public; 46 it must perform a function "traditionally the exclusive
141. See Rosenberry, Application of the Federal and State Constitutions, supra note 125, at 12. Note
that Rosenberry lists these items as matters regulated by the California Department of Real Estate; she does
not believe that the enforcement of this extensive set of agreements would amount to state action. Id.
142. Harold W. Horowitz & Kenneth L. Karst, The Proposition Fourteen Cases: Justice in Search of
a Justification, 14 UCLA L. REV. 37, 45 (1966). This argument should not be taken to mean, for example,
that the existence of a contract between an association and a member gives rise to state action simply
because one party may call the state for enforcement in the event of a breach.
143. See Surfside 84 Condominium Council of Unit Owners v. Mullen (Chy. Case No. 13,915, Md.
Cir. CL Worcester County, Feb. 27, 1984) (unpublished decision) discussed in Golden Sands Club
Condominium v. Waller, 545 A.2d 1332, 1336 n.5 (Md. 1988) (noting that Surfside 84 decision had
prompted legislature to revise law in question).
144. 485 U.S. 478 (1988).
145. Laguna Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 827 (Ct. App.) (emphasis
omitted), appeal dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1192 (1982).
146. See, e.g., San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987)
(holding that organization promoting amateur sports was not state actor because neither conduct nor
coordination of sports was traditional governmental function).
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prerogative of the State."' 147 Hence the function performed must involve
"some power delegated to [the private entity] by the State which is
traditionally associated with sovereignty, such as eminent domain."'14 The
most recent interpretation of this test emphasized determining "whether the
actor is performing a traditional governmental function."'
' 49
A strong case can be made that residential associations qualify as state
actors under the public function test. Robert Natelson, author of the leading
textbook on homeowners' associations, argues that public law ought not apply
to associations and disparages the analogy between associations and
governments, citing "their narrow range of functions, at least compared to
general governments; and the absence of the redistributive, police, conscriptive,
general welfare taxation, and enforcement privileges characteristic of sovereign
power."' 50 But police and revenue-raising functions are in fact quite
prominent activities of residential associations. As one recent account notes,
"They collect taxes and provide public services, including police protection,
street cleaning, snow removal, trash collection and park administration. They
enforce their detailed codes of behavior and property maintenance through
fines and liens on residents' homes."' 5' It is hard to see how the issue of
governmental reimbursement of associations for performance of municipal
services could engender such controversy"' unless the services provided by
these associations were extensive.
Many services performed by these associations are similar to those
performed by local governments.'53 Dominion over the streets is the most
obvious example of authority traditionally associated with the state. Some of
the supplementary services fall into this category as well. Articulating the
range of "traditional government functions" in the 1976 case of National
League of Cities v. Usery, Justice Rehnquist listed "fire prevention, police
protection, sanitation, public health, and parks and recreation .... [lit is
functions such as these which governments are created to provide .... 154
The only difference between government property and services and those of
an association is the association's attempt to privatize these services. One
147. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353 (1974) (holding that electric company's
termination of service upon nonpayment of bills did not violate due process as company was not state
actor).
148. Id.
149. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 621 (1991).
150. Natelson, supra note 32, at 49.
151. Evan McKenzie, When Your Home Is Mostly Other People's Castle, PLAIN DEALER, Aug. 19,
1994, at IIB.
152. See supra Subsection II.B.2.
153. Thereby creating obvious parallels to the company town in Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501
(1946). See also Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 181 (1961) (Douglas, J., concurring) (citing Marsh,
326 U.S. 501) ("Towns, though wholly owned by private interests, perform municipal functions and are
held to the same constitutional requirements as ordinary municipalities.").
154. 426 U.S. 833, 852, 851 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469
U.S. 528 (1985).
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guide to tax exemptions for residential associations admits the public character
of the property and services provided by associations. It explains, "Property
traditionally recognized and accepted as governmental in nature (e.g. roadways,
park lands, sidewalks, street lights, and firehouses) may also qualify as
association property."'' 55 Yet the constraints placed upon state actors are
intended to forestall the assumption of control over these functions of local
government without the acceptance of concomitant responsibilities. If
residential associations are able to exercise the powers associated with serving
a public function, they must also shoulder the responsibilities.
Finally, at common law, performance of the functions today served by
residential associations justified treating private individuals as state actors. As
the U.S. Supreme Court noted in the 1876 case of Munn v. Illinois, "Looking,
then, to the common law... we find that when private property is 'affected
with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only.""' 5 6 Seven years
later, Justice Harlan, in his dissenting opinion in The Civil Rights Cases,1
5 7
would have upheld the 1875 Civil Rights Act as applied to common carriers
because owners and operators of private thoroughfares, inns, and parks at
common law were treated as essentially state actors because of the public
function they performed. 5 The fact that owners of private roads used by the
public on occasion were viewed as state actors has two implications. First,
mere private ownership by contemporary residential associations cannot
convert formerly public streets and parks into private property. Second, a
private person who is the owner or even administrator of a street or park is
properly regarded as a state actor because of the public function he or she
performs.
3. The Impact of Treating Residential Associations as State Actors
The argument advanced by this Note is intended to prevent residential
associations from assuming governmental authority without governmental
responsibilities, and to make clear the public interest invested in the behavior
of putatively private associations. As residential associations have heretofore
enjoyed largely free rein, much of what follows is necessarily somewhat
speculative. The expected impacts of the suggestions in this Note are twofold.
First, treating residential associations as state actors should require residential
associations to assume a higher level of responsibility to the public, following
the principle that, "[w]here an organization is quasi-public, its power to
exclude must be reasonably and lawfully exercised in furtherance of the public
155. Campbell-Bell, supra note 81, at 651.
156. 94 U.S. 113, 125-26 (1876) (upholding Illinois legislature's regulation of charges for use of grain
elevators).
157. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
158. Id. at 37-43 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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welfare related to its public characteristics.' '5 9 This increased responsibility
could of course have the effect of discouraging the formation of residential
associations. Second, treating residential associations as state actors should
require associations to choose between serving as public or private entities,
resolving a confusion over role that associations currently manipulate to great
advantage. In general, the expected result of the recommendations advanced
by this Note would be a halt to the privatization of public space to the degree
that such privatization is harmful to those who do not, or cannot, share in the
privileges of membership. For example, nothing would prevent an association
from hiring security guards so long as those guards did not attempt to force
innocent pedestrians out of the neighborhood. Nor would the argument
presented in this Note prevent an association from collecting membership dues
to ensure that its streets were clean or well lit so long as other members of the
public could use those streets as well.
Applying the state action test to evaluate the impact of an association's
behavior on nonmembers should not be confused with applying the state action
test to police relations between associations and their members. 60 As
discussed above, the principle of reasonableness is a powerful limiting force
on the remedies available to members who challenge a residential association's
policies. This principle, however, fails to provide meaningful guidance in the
cases this Note is concerned about: conflicts between associations and
nonmembers. Furthermore, applying the state action test does not mean that
every harm described in the preceding sections of this Note can be limited. If,
for example, a residential association is considered a virtual government and
fulfills its responsibilities as such, there is no reason why members should not
be able to receive tax deductions for their association membership fees. This
benefit, however, comes with the responsibilities borne by government, most
importantly, compliance with the constitutional standards of equal protection
and due process. Application of the state action test is not intended to
eliminate the power of residential associations but simply to match this power
with appropriate responsibilities.
The first important effect of treating residential associations as state actors
would be that constitutional obligations would trump the associations'
covenants and practices with respect to nonmembers. 16' As discussed in Part
II, the treatment residential associations frequently accord nonmembers raises
a host of constitutional concerns, including limitations on First Amendment
159. Matthews v. Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 471 A.2d 355, 366, 368 (N.J. 1984) (recognizing
public trust invested in tidal lands and consequent obligation of homeowners' association to keep beaches
open to public). The association in this case benefitted from the municipality's free capital improvements,
office space, and tax exemptions. Id. at 367-68.
160. One strong advocate of residential associations rejects the state action test altogether on the
assumption that it would have to apply to relations between the association and its members. See
Rosenberry, Application of the State and Federal Constitutions, supra note 125, at 28-3 1.
161. With respect to members, the CC&Rs would likely remain dispositive. See supra note 117.
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rights to freedom of speech and association; the right to travel; due process
issues raised by the application of an association's rules to nonmembers; and
equal protection questions raised by discrimination on the basis of race or
class. These concerns arise in different contexts, including the initial
development of the property, the use by nonmembers of an association's streets
or other properties, and the use of public funds as a subsidy for one
neighborhood but not another.162 Nonmembers would be able to challenge
existing practices with discriminatory effects on constitutional grounds in
addition to bringing suits to impede the transfer of authority from a local
government to a residential association, the option currently available. For
example, an individual belonging to a minority group who is denied access to
the city blocks comprising a particular association, or who is roughed up by
a security guard, would be able to bring an action against the association for
discrimination and damages.
This effect would likely raise the objection that treating residential
associations as state actors would infringe upon property rights. While this is
a valid claim where a single developer has built a residential community on a
previously deserted site, it becomes less persuasive if taken to mean that
neighborhoods can simply decide to secede and take formerly public streets
and parks with them.'63 Such an objection in the latter context relies on a
willful confusion between private and public property. As the Whitley Heights
court objected, "If the streets are still 'public,' it makes no sense to classify
them as public when it comes to the expenditure of public funds, but classify
them as private when it comes to public use. [The association] cannot have it
both ways."' 64 One theorist explains that "the association of the municipal
corporation with home and family provides a stronger foundation for legal
localism .... At the same time, it obscures the perception of local government
as a state institution and thus erodes the longstanding legal rule that local
162. The statutory authority for remedying such actions would be provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
which establishes civil liability for any deprivation of right "under color of' state law. See, e.g., Lugar v.
Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). Note that this statute did not come into play in Laguna
Publishing Co. v. Golden Rain Found., 182 Cal. Rptr. 813, 832 (Ct. App.), appeal dismissed for want of
a substantial federal question, 459 U.S. 1192 (1982), as plaintiff neither pleaded nor proved a right to
damages under this section.
163. Hence a frequently advanced justification for exclusive communities is not applicable here. A
common formulation of the argument is that "the owner's right to exclude [is] 'one of the most essential
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property."' Loretto v. Teleprompter
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433 (1982) (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
176 (1979)). Apart from the troubling imagery of the fasces this metaphor evokes, this argument presumes
that one has a legitimate claim to the property in question. For reasons given supra Section II.C., public
property should not simply be doled out to exclusive communities on demand. Even if this transfer has
occurred, the degree of state involvement may continue to be so great that the assertion of private rights
may simply be a pretext for the assumption of state power. As McKenzie puts it, residential associations
"represent the de facto privatization of local government services for the few." MCKENZIE, supra note 2,
at 26.
164. Citizens Against Gated Enclaves v. Whitley Heights Civic Ass'n, 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 451, 457 (Ct.
App. 1994).
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government actions are attributable to the state."'65 The analysis advanced
by this Note is committed to preserving this rule. The secession of a residential
association is not a simple land transaction. If seceding neighborhoods merely
assert their dominion over certain streets without compensation, the public at
large is robbed of the resources it invested in the streets and parks now under
private control. Even if local governments allow neighborhoods to secede only
if they offer compensation, we still run the danger of reducing public space to
isolated ghettoes too poor or unorganized to fend for themselves, exacerbating
class and racial disparities, and balkanizing society.
The second major effect of treating residential associations as state actors
would be an end to the role manipulation through which residential
associations enjoy public powers without public responsibilities. The most
likely and most desirable result is that residential associations would choose
to forgo special advantages and rights allocated to them by state and local
governments insofar as they do not want to be liable for the exercise of these
advantages to the detriment of members of the public. These associations
would remain free, however, to regulate their own members' behavior. For
example, a would-be gated community like Whitley Heights would be enjoined
from prohibiting access to its streets while it would remain free to contract
among its members to ensure that their houses and property not be used for
business purposes, or to ban large dogs, or even to insist that houses be
painted a certain color. 66 Residential associations could also hire security
personnel for the neighborhoods, install better lighting, or contract for
improved garbage collection or snow removal. It may be that residential
associations would choose to forgo some of their government-granted
privileges if the benefits did not outweigh the costs. The members might
conclude that the extra expenditures they make to preserve their community are
too diffuse, as the funds they spend have the secondary effect of benefiting
nonmembers. Still, this solution best controls the negative externalities of
associations' actions without eliminating their basic right to associate in the
first place.
t67
Of course, exposing residential associations to the magnified liability
associated with the status of state actor might have a detrimental effect on their
attractiveness to potential members. Some Americans may well be attracted by
the possibility for racial and economic segregation provided by some
165. Briffault, supra note 37, at 382. See generally Barak-Erez, supra note 97 (arguing that extent of
privatization requires expansion of state action doctrine).
166. Note that, in this regard, these suggestions will not allay the concerns raised by Richard Louv,
who asks, "Will human individuality win out over the dictatorship of the condo proletariat?" LOUV, supra
note 86, at 123.
167. This would also alleviate the problem of the secession of the successful. See supra Section II.C.
So long as the outside world has some impact on the community, members have an incentive not to forget
about concerns external to the life of the association.
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associations. 16 Yet courts should not weigh in on the side of protecting these
prejudices. Holding associations liable as state actors strikes a balance between
private and public goods, a balance that is protective of freedom of association
yet skeptical of the value of illiberal enclaves. 6 9 Associations may have
security and private guards, but not security and private guards who
disproportionately harass minorities. They may preserve or enhance property
values, so long as these values are not achieved by erecting insurmountable
barriers to entry. Finally, they may establish a heightened degree of privacy
and separateness, so long as it does not come at the price of total abdication
of civic responsibility. Applying a different standard of liability to residential
associations will discourage the development of such associations only to the
extent such associations are illiberal enclaves rather than safe, supportive
communities. Certainly, adherence to a standard of public rather than private
liability may make existence more difficult for certain associations. Yet if
some residential associations simply cannot exist without causing public harms,
we might well question whether they should be formed in the first place.
IV. CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to present an appropriate framework to enable
courts to evaluate the effects of residential associations on nonmembers. The
explosive growth and popularity of residential associations can, if ignored,
impose a variety of harms on nonmembers, who are affected by exclusion,
discrimination, and a disintegrating tax base. Such are the results when
residential associations wield quasi-governmental power without any of the
concomitant obligations. By suggesting that the standard of judicial review of
a residential association's behavior match the nature of the power the
association enjoys, this Note hopes to limit the negative externalities that stem
from the exercise of the association members' right to freedom of association.
Finding that residential associations are state actors can effectively put an end
to practices of discrimination and exclusion. This analytical framework will
help weed out the negative aspects of residential associations while preserving
those features that benefit members at no cost to the public. Of course, the
ability to reside in certain communities will always be dependent on social
class. The real question is whether such communities should be allowed to
assume governmental powers without governmental responsibilities.
168. This possibility is demonstrated by the fact that "whites are willing to pay more for the
occupancy of real property provided they reside in the vicinity of other whites." 2 U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL
RIGHTS, ISSUES IN HOUSING DISCRIMINATION 4 (1986), quoted in Ford, supra note 40, at 1849 n.15.
169. It might be objected that the very reason members join secessionist associations is to escape from
governmental responsibilities. However, subjecting the behavior of associations to state action review is
not an affirmation or expansion of their responsibilities toward govemment, but a recognition that they owe
a minimum level of responsibility to the public at large.
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